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OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING GO¨DEL’S 1931
PAOLA CATTABRIGA
Abstract. This article demonstrates the invalidity of Theorem VI in Go¨del’s
monograph of 1931, by showing that
(15) xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r17Z(x))],
(16) xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Neg(Sb(r17Z(x))],
(derived by definition (8.1) Q(x, y) ≡ xBκ[Sb(y19Z(y))] respectively from
(3) R(x1, . . . , xn) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r
u1...un
Z(x1)...Z(xn)
)],
(4) R(x1, . . . , xn) −→ Bewκ[Neg(Sb(r
u1...un
Z(x1)...Z(xn)
)],
of Theorem V) are false in P . This is achieved in two steps. First, the pred-
icate complementary to the well-known Go¨del’s predicate Bew(x) is defined
by adding a new relation Wid(x). In accordance, new logical connections are
established, Lemma (6). Second,
(I) xBk(17Genr)→ Bewk[Sb(r
17
Z(x)
)],
(II) xBκ(17Genr)→ Bewk[Neg(Sb(r
17
Z(x)
)],
are derived from Lemma (6) and definition (8.1). It amounts to saying that
(15) and (16) are false and unacceptable for the system (P ). On the account
of that, the two well-known cases
1. 17Gen r is not κ–PROVABLE,
2. Neg(17Gen r) is not κ–PROVABLE,
can not be drawn (unless we say that they are true because ((15)& (I)) ⊃ 1.
and ((16) & (II)) ⊃ 2. are examples of (p&∼p) ⊃ q, i. e. ex falso sequitur
quodlibet).
Introduction. “Wir mu¨ssen wissen. Wir werden wissen.” We must know. We
will know. With these words, pronounced at the International Congress of Math-
ematicians in Paris, in 1900, Hilbert settled the basis of the logical investigations
of the foundations of mathematics of the twentieth century. Whatever they were
commands or wishes, they put the human spirit in a position of certainty about the
solvability of every mathematical problem. These words embodied ancient aspira-
tions, such as the achievement of a general problem-solving method, like Ramon
Lull’s Ars Magna, or the completion of a universal symbolic language like Leibnitz’s
Characteristica and Frege’s Begriffsschrift [2, -4]. But for histories sense of humor,
or for the unpredictability of human nature, they were just at the starting point of
the exploration which led to the accomplishment of the opposite position, see for
example the conviction of Godfrey Hardy in 1928.
“ There is of course no such theorem, and this is very fortunate,
since if there were we should have a mechanical set of rules for
the solution of all mathematical problems, and our activities as
mathematicians would come to an end.” [15, -93]
1
It was hard to believe that statements about numbers like Fermat’s Last Theorem
and Goldbach’s conjecture which the efforts of the centuries have failed to solve,
could in fact be decided by a mechanical process. All this found its culmination
in Go¨del’s 1931 article, that placed severe limits on the power of mathematical
reasoning and on the power of the axiomatic method [10].
Many mathematicians at the end of the nineteenth-century considered consis-
tency to be sufficient in securing the existence of theoretical objects. The result
obtained by Go¨del in 1930 assuring the existence of a model for the first order logic,
apparently confirmed this opinion [9]. However, for Go¨del comparing consistency
with existence
“ manifestly presupposes the axiom that every mathematical prob-
lem is solvable. Or, more precisely, it presupposes that we cannot
prove the unsolvability of any problem.” [8, 60-61]
Through Go¨del’s contributions, the reference to the existence of unsolvable prob-
lems in mathematics is recurring (see note 61 in [10, 190-191]), together with it’s
winding exchange with the existence of undecidable propositions [10, 144-145]. This
connection of unsolvable problems and undecidable propositions, was supported by
the conviction that
“ there are true propositions (which may even be provable by means
of other principles) that cannot be derived in the system under
consideration.” [9, 102-103]
So that, for Go¨del, there were unsolvable problems in mathematics that, although
contentually true, were unprovable in the formal system (P in [10, 150-151]).
“(Assuming the consistency of classical mathematics) one can even
give examples of propositions (and in fact of those of the type of
Goldbach or Fermat) that, while contentually true, are unprovable
in the formal system of classical mathematics.” [11, 202-203]
Nowadays the developments concerning Fermat’s last theorem [21, 20], clarify that
problems with no solution are not so unprovable in mathematics. We are then
allowed to state that, in Go¨del’s convictions, around the existence of undecidable
problems in mathematics, there is a presupposition of unprovability that the present
article will help to clarify.
Of all the remarkable logical achievements of the twentieth century perhaps the
most outstanding is Go¨del’s celebrated incompleteness argumentation of 1931. In
contrast to Hilbert’s program which called for embodying classical mathematics in
a formal system and proving that system consistent by finitary methods [13, 14],
Go¨del’s paper showed that not even the first step could be carried out fully, any
formal system suitable for the arithmetic of integers was incomplete [10, 12].
Go¨del’s incompleteness argument holds today the same scientific status as Ein-
stein’s principle of relativity, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and Watson and
Crick’s double helix model of DNA [3, -315]. With absolute respect and acknowl-
edgement for the extraordinary contribution given by Go¨del to the logical inves-
tigation, this article brings Go¨del’s achievement into question by the definition of
the refutability predicate as a number-theoretical statement.
As is well known, Go¨del numbering is a special device by which each expression
in arithmetic can refer to itself. Just a declarative programmer can catch the
extraordinary expressive power of Go¨del numbering.
“Many of the logicians who worked in the first half of this century
were actually the first inventors of programming languages. Go¨del
uses a scheme for expressing algorithms that is much like the high-
level language LISP ... .” [7, -19] “But if you read his original
1931 paper with the benefit of hindsight, you’ll see that Go¨del is
programming in LISP, ... .” [7, -14]
It was precisely with this view of Go¨del programming recursive statements that
the content of this work was conceived. According to Go¨del’s first incompleteness
argument it is possible to construct a formally undecidable proposition in PM, a
statement that, although true, turns out to be neither provable nor refutable for the
system. This article develops proof of invalidity of Theorem VI in Go¨del’s 1931, the
so-called Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem, in two steps: defining refutability
within the same recursive status as provability and showing that as a consequence
propositions (15) and (16), derived from definition 8.1 in Go¨del’s 1931 [10, 174-175],
are false and unacceptable for the system. The achievement of their falsity blocks
the derivation of Theorem VI, which turns out to be therefore invalid, together
with all the depending theorems (Sections 1, 2 and 3).
Completeness is connected to decidability since a resolution procedure takes
advantages of those sorts of logical inferences formalized also by the axiomatic
systems. With respect to the finitely axiomatized systems, it leads to a theoretical
list of all theorems, which is in turn a procedure of semi-decidability for the first
order logic. With regard to that, the Lemmas of Section 1 are clarifying and
opening new perspectives, partially already exposed in [4, 6]. In fact this work
applies directly to the text of Go¨del’s 1931 article, the results obtained in [4] for
the modern version of the incompleteness argument, which is mainly based on the
diagonalization lemma. It provides therefore as a novel contribution clear and
advanced proof of the invalidity of Go¨del’s original argument. For all these aspects
the result exposed here stands out from previous criticism of Go¨del’s 1931, mainly
focused on the antinomic features of Go¨del’s self-reference statement, (see [16], [1],
[18], resumed in [17]; [19]). In the following the reader is required to be familiar
with Go¨del’s 1931 [10].
1.
Let us begin adding to the list of functions (relations) 1-45 in Go¨del’s 1931 two
new relations, 45.1 and 46.1, in terms of the preceding ones by the procedures given
in Theorems I-IV [10, 158-163]. We shall recall only the well-known definitions 44.,
45. and 46., for the whole list the reader is referred to [10, 162-171].
44. Bw(x) ≡ (n){0 < n ≤ l(x) −→ Ax(nGl x) ∨ (Ep, q)[0 < p, q < n &
Fl(nGl x, pGl x, q Gl x)]} & l(x) > 0,
x is a PROOF ARRAY (a finite sequence of FORMULAS, each of which is either
an AXIOM or an IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE of two of the preceding FOR-
MULAS).
45. xBy ≡ Bw(x) & [l(x)]Gl x = y,
x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y.
45.1. xWy ≡ Bw(x) & [l(x)]Gl x = Neg(y),
x is a REFUTATION of the FORMULA y.
46. Bew(x) ≡ (Ey)yBx,
x is a PROVABLE FORMULA. (Bew(x) is the first one of the notions 1–46 of
which we cannot assert that it is recursive.)
46.1. Wid(x) ≡ (Ez)zWx,
x is a REFUTABLE FORMULA. (Wid(x) is the second one of the notions 1–46
of which we cannot assert that it is recursive.) Wid is the shortening for “Wider-
legung” and must not be mistaken with the notion defined by Go¨del in note 63
referring instead to “Widerspruchsfrei” [10, 192-193], which afterwards we will call
Wids.
Being classes included among relations, as one-place relation, 44. define the
recursive class of the proof arrays. Recursive relations R have the property that
for every given n-tuple of numbers it can be decided whether R(x1 . . . xn) holds
or not. 45. and 45.1 define recursive relations, xBy and xWy, so that for every
given couple of numbers it can be decided whether xBy and xWy hold or not. In
accordance we can state the following Lemmas.
Lemma 1.
(x){Wid(x) ∼ Bew[Neg(x)]} and (x){Bew(x) ∼ Wid[Neg(x)]}.
Proof. Immediately by 46.1., 46., 45.1., 45. and Neg(Neg(x)) ∼ x. 
Lemma 2. For any x, y in P ,
not both xWy and xBy.
Proof. Let us suppose to have, for an arbitrary couple x, y, both xWy and xBy in
P . By 45. and 45.1
Bw(x) & [l(x)]Gl x = y & Bw(x) & [l(x)]Gl x = Neg(y),
then by 44.
(n){0 < n ≤ l(x) −→ Ax(nGl x)∨
(Ep, q)[0 < p, q < n & Fl(nGl x, pGl x, q Gl x)]} &
l(x) > 0 & [l(x)]Gl x = y & [l(x)]Gl x = Neg(y).
For l(x) > 0 and n = l(x) this should be
Ax(y) & Ax(Neg(y)) ∨ (Ep, q)[0 < p, q < n &
Fl(y, pGl x, q Gl x) & Fl(Neg(y), pGl x, q Gl x)]
which is impossible by 42. Ax(x), 43. Fl(x, y, z) and by the definitions of the
axioms and of immediate consequence in P . 
Recursive functions have the property that, for each given set of values of the
arguments, the value of the function can be computed by a finite procedure [12,
-348, 369-371]. The following Lemma, especially as regard to l, Gl and Neg, is
involved with this property and the today’s notion of effective computability.
Lemma 3. For any x, y such that x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y, in P ,
xBy or xWy.
Proof. Assume that x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y. Then, 45., xBy, and from
the schema p ⊃ p ∨ q, II.2. [10, 154-155], xBy ⊃ xBy ∨ xWy so that xBy ∨ xWy,
i. e. for any x, y such that x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y, xBy ∨ xWy. 
In the case that x is a PROOF of the FORMULA Neg(y), i.e. [l(x)]Gl x =
Neg(y), the same Lemma can be derived as follows. Given Bw(x), [l(x)]Gl x is
a natural number for a FORMULA z. Neg is a recursive function so that we have a
finite procedure to determine the value of Neg(y). Let us suppose that z = Neg(y),
then xBz is true, and from xBz ⊃ xBz ∨ xWz we draw xBz ∨ xWz. We notice
that this Lemma holds for any FORMULA z such that [l(x)]Gl x = z even if xBz
is xWy.
Lemma 4. For any x, y such that x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y, in P ,
xWy ∼ xBy.
Proof. Immediately by Lemma (2) and Lemma (3). 
Let us notice that Lemma (4) yields, for any x, y such that x is a PROOF
of the FORMULA y in P , also xWy ∼ xBy.
Lemma 5. For any x, y such that x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y, in P ,
Bew(y) if xBy and Wid(y) iff xBy.
Proof. Let us assume that x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y and xBy. As an
immediate consequence we have (x)xBy. By 46. Bew(y) ∼ (Ex)xBy, Bew(y) ∼
(Ex)xBy and Bew(y) ∼ (x)xBy. Accordingly for any x, y such that x is a PROOF
of the FORMULA y, Bew(y) if xBy.
Let us assume that x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y. By 45. xBy and from
Lemma (4) xWy ∼ xBy, so that xWy. (x)xWy is an immediate consequence
of xWy, hence (x)xWy. (p& q) ⊃ (p ∼ q) yields then (x)xWy ∼ xBy. By
46.1 Wid(y) ∼ (Ex)xWy, so that Wid(y) ∼ (Ex)xWy and Wid(y) ∼ (x)xWy.
Accordingly, for any x, y such that x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y, Wid(y) ∼
xBy. 
All preceding Lemmas were carried out constructively, needlessly to assume con-
sistency. Let us recall the following Go¨del’s definitions [10, -173]. Let κ be any
class of FORMULAS and Flg(κ) the smallest set of FORMULAS that contains all
FORMULAS of κ and all AXIOMS, and is closed under the relation IMMEDIATE
CONSEQUENCE.
Bwκ(x) ≡(n)[n ≤ l(x) −→ Ax(nGl x) ∨ (nGl x) ∈ κ∨
(Ep, q){0 < p, q < n & Fl(nGlx, pGlx, qGlx)}] & l(x) > 0,
(5)
(6) xBκy ≡ Bwκ(x) & [l(x)]Gl x = y,
(6.1) Bewκ(x) ≡ (Ey)yBκx,
(7) (x)[Bewκ(x) ∼ x ∈ Flg(κ)].
Let us augment this list with two new definitions.
(6.2) xWκy ≡ Bwκ(x) & [l(x)]Gl x = Neg(y),
(6.2.1) Widκ(x) ≡ (Ey)yWκx.
We add further that (6.1) and (7) yield
(7.1) (x)[(Ey)yBκx ∼ x ∈ Flg(κ)].
Lemma 6. For any x such that Bwκ(x) and any FORMULA y such that
[l(x)]Gl x = y in κ
Bewκ(y) if xBκy and Widκ(y) iff xBκy.
Proof. By Lemma (5) and previous definitions. 
Lemma 7. Given a CLASS SIGN a with the FREE VARIABLE v and a SIGN c
of the same type as v,
if Bewκ(vGen a) then Bewκ[Sb(avc)],(i)
if Widκ(vGen a) then Widκ[Sb(avc)].(ii)
Proof. (i) Let us suppose that Bewκ[Sb(a
v
c)], then from (7) Sb(a
v
c) ∈ Flg(κ). F lg(κ)
is closed under the relation IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE therefore vGen a ∈
Flg(κ). Thus, by (7) again, Bewκ(vGen a). Accordingly if Bewκ(vGen a) then
Bewκ[Sb(avc)].
(ii) Let us suppose that Widκ(vGen a), then, by Lemma (6), for any x such
that Bwκ(x) and [l(x)]Gl x = vGen a in κ, xBκ(vGen a). By (7.1)
1 we have
therefore vGen a ∈ Flg(κ). Thanks to Axiom III.12,we obtain Sb(avc) ∈ Flg(κ)
and from (7.1) again, we have (Ez)zBκ[Sb(a
v
c)]. Finally, from Lemma (6) we have
Widκ[Sb(avc)] (for any x such that Bwκ(x) and [l(x)]Gl x = vGen a). 
2.
We are now ready to derive the main result of this article, Theorem (8). The
invalidity of Theorem VI in Go¨del’s 1931 article [10, 172-177] follows from Lemmas
(6) and (7). In Go¨del’s 1931 argumentation the proof that both 17Gen r and
Neg(17Gen r) are not κ–PROVABLE is based on the two statements [10, 174-176]
(15) xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r
17
Z(x))]
(16) xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Neg(Sb(r
17
Z(x))],
which are respectively deduced from Q(x, y) and Q(x, y), whereas
(8.1) Q(x, y) ≡ xBκ[Sb(y19Z(y))].
1If, for any x such that Bwκ(x) and [l(x)]Gl x = vGen a, xBκ(vGen a) then, for any x such
that Bwκ(x) and [l(x)]Gl x = vGen a, (Ey)yBκ(vGen a).
2III. Any formula that results from the schema
1. vΠ(a) ⊃ Subst a(vc )
when the following substitutions are made for a, v, and c (and the operation indicated by Subs
is performed in 1): for a any formula, for v any variable and for c any sign of the same type as v,
provided c does not contain any variable that is bound in a at a place where v is free [10, 154-155;
37. 38. 168-169].
More precisely, Q(x, y) is an instance of R(x1, . . . , xn) in
(3) R(x1, . . . , xn) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r
u1...un
Z(x1)...Z(xn)
)],
as exactly as Q(x, y) is an example of R(x1, . . . , xn) in
(4) R(x1, . . . , xn) −→ Bewκ[Neg(Sb(r
u1...un
Z(x1)...Z(xn)
)],
(Theorem V [10, 170-171]), so that (3) −→ (9) −→ (15) and (4) −→ (10) −→ (16)
[10, 170-175].
In accordance with Lemmas (6) and (7) we will show that given Q(x, y), (15)
turns out to be false, and, similarly, given Q(x, y), (16) results to be false. We will
show then as a consequence that Theorem VI in Go¨del’s 1931 [10, 172-173] is not
achievable.
Proof. Let us assume Q(x, y) in κ, then by definition (8.1)
(I.1) xBκ[Sb(y19Z(y))].
We substitute in it p for y, see definitions
(11) p = 17Gen q,
(p is a CLASS SIGN with the FREE VARIABLE 19),
(12) r = Sb(q19Z(p))
(r is a recursive CLASS SIGN with the FREE VARABLE 17) and
(13) Sb(p19Z(p)) = Sb([17Gen q]
19
Z(p)) = 17GenSb(q
19
Z(p)) = 17Gen r
in [10, 174-175], so that we have
(I.2) xBκ(17Gen r).
By a→ (eb→ e(a→ b)) we have
(I.3) xBκ(17Gen r) −→
[
Bewκ[Sb(r17Z(x))] −→
xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r17Z(x))
] ]
,
hence, by (I.2),
(I.4) Bewκ[Sb(r17Z(x))] −→ xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r
17
Z(x))] .
Lemma (6) yields for any x such that Bwκ(x), and [l(x)]Gl x = 17Gen r,
Bewκ(17Gen r) if xBκ(17Gen r),
accordingly from (I.2)
(I.5) Bewκ(17Gen r),
and by Lemma (7) (i)
(I.6) Bewκ[Sb(r17Z(x))].
(I.4) and (I.6) yield, for any x such that Bwκ(x), and [l(x)]Gl x = 17Gen r,
(I) xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r17Z(x))].

Proof. Let us assume Q(x, y) in κ, so that by (8.1), substituting p for y, (11), (12)
and (13), we obtain
(II.1) xBκ(17Gen r).
From a→ (∼b→ ∼(a→ b)),
(II.2) xBκ(17Gen r) −→[
Widκ[Sb(r17Z(x))] −→ xBκ(17Gen r) −→Widκ[Sb(r
17
Z(x))]
]
,
and then
(II.3) Widκ[Sb(r17Z(x))] −→ xBκ(17Gen r) −→Widκ[Sb(r
17
Z(x))] .
From Lemma (6), for any x such that Bwκ(x), and [l(x)]Gl x = 17Gen r
Widκ(17Gen r) iff xBκ(17Gen r),
and II.1
(II.4) Widκ(17Gen r).
Lemma (7) (ii)3 yields, for any x such that Bwκ(x), and [l(x)]Gl x = 17Gen r,
(II.5) Widκ[Sb(r17Z(x))]
and from II.3
(II.6) xBκ(17Gen r) −→Widκ[Sb(r17Z(x))].
Finally, by Lemma (1), for any x such that Bwκ(x), and [l(x)]Gl x = 17Gen r,
(II) xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Neg(Sb(r17Z(x))].

By (I) and (II), (15) and (16) turn out to be false for any x such that x is a
PROOF ARRAY which last FORMULA is 17Gen r in κ, and the demonstration
of Theorem VI cannot be accomplished. Indeed, for n such that Bwκ(n) and
[l(n)]Gl n = 17Gen r, (I) and (II) yield in κ
nBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r17Z(n))]
and
nBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Neg(Sb(r17Z(n))],
hence, within the case
“1. 17Gen r is not κ–PROVABLE”
in Go¨del’s 1931 [10, 176-177], Bewκ[Neg(Sb(r
17
Z(n))] has no basis to be obtained
from nBκ(17Gen r) in κ, therefore no proof that 17Gen r is not κ–PROVABLE
can be achieved.
Accordingly, (n)nBκ(17Gen r) has no soundness as a consequence of (6.1) within
the next case
3Z(x) does not contain any variable bound in r at a place at which 17 is free. This mainly
because Z(x) is by definition, 17. Z(n) [10, 164-165], a NUMERAL and as such does not contain
any variable. But if we think to x in Z(x) as to the PROOF ARRAY such that Bwκ(x) and
[l(x)]Gl x = 17Gen r, x cannot be a variable bound in r at a place at which 17 is free, since x > r
(see definitions 6. nGl x and 7. l(x) [10, 162-163]) and, as it can be shown by induction on the
recursive definition 44. Bw(x), x is not in r.
“2. Neg(17Gen r) is not κ–PROVABLE”
[10, 176-177]. Moreover, for n such that Bwκ(n) and [l(n)]Gl n = 17Gen r,
Bewκ[(Sb(r
17
Z(n))] is not a consequence of nBκ(17Gen r) in κ, so that neither a
demonstration that Neg(17Gen r) is not κ–PROVABLE can be accomplished.
Consequently the statement of Theorem VI, “For every ω–consistent recursive
class κ of FORMULAS there are recursive CLASS SIGNS r such that neither
vGen r nor Neg(vGen r) belongs to Flg(κ) (where v is the FREE V ARIABLE
of r)” [10, 172-173], has no proof.
Furthermore, the assertion that “ it suffices for the existence of propositions
undecidable that the class κ be ω–consistent”, is now meaningless [10, 176-177]. We
can then state the following theorem.
Theorem 8. The existence of undecidable propositions of the form vGen r is not
a theorem in κ.
The invalidity of theorems VIII, IX and XI, all consequent of theorem VI, follows
immediately [10, 184-194]. In the outlined derivation of theorem XI [10, 192-194],
the assertion that 17Gen r is not κ–PROVABLE, together with the assumption
about the consistency of κ, have now no justification. Therefore the statements
Wids(κ) −→ Bewκ(17Gen r) (23) and Wids(κ) −→ (x)Q(x, p) (24) are in P
without soundness (Wids(κ) means “κ is consistent” and is defined by Wids(κ)
≡ (Ex)(Form(x)&Bewκ(x)), see note 63 [10, 192-193]).
3.
To resume briefly, in Go¨del’s 1931, (15) and (16) are derived by means of defi-
nition (8.1) Q(x, y) from (3) and (4) taking respectively Q(x, y) as an instance of
R(x1, . . . , xn) and Q(x, y) as an instance of R(x1, . . . , xn), and then the two cases
“1. 17Gen r is not κ–PROVABLE” and “2. Neg(17Gen r) is not κ–PROVABLE”
are derived respectively from (15) and (16) (figure 1).
Any deduction is sound at whatever row if it is sound at all the preceding rows.
Within the whole of Go¨del’s 1931 the propositions (15) and (16) are meant to be
sound to secure the correctness of the conclusions. As showed in Sections 1 and 2
this is not the case. By Lemmas (6) and (7), given Q(x, y), the negation of (15),
(I), can be deduced and, given Q(x, y), we can obtain the negation of (16), (II).
This invalidates the deduction of propositions (15) and (16) (figure 2). Indeed the
soundness of “1. 17Gen r is not κ–PROVABLE” and “2. Neg(17Gen r) is not
κ–PROVABLE” is based respectively on the soundness of (15) and (16). As we
showed (15) and (16) are false (figure 3), therefore there are no sound bases in
Go¨del’s 1931 to state Theorem VI, Theorem (8).
A definition of a new relation, like 8.1, is supposed to be true at the row it is
asserted. Let us consider this definition at the light of our results. For Q(x, y) as a
true relation we have both
Q(x, y) −→ xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r
17
Z(x))],
Q(x, y) −→ xBκ(17Gen r) −→ Bewκ[Sb(r17Z(x))],
i. e. definition (8.1) implies a formula and its negation. A ancient tradition
identifies a contradiction with a couple of propositions where one is the negation
of the other. If Q(x, y) is considered to be true then a contradiction follows, the
couple (15) and (I). Such a couple can be regarded from two distinguished point of
views: the consequences for Q(x, y) and the consequences for P (and κ). The first
point-view delivers directly to the antinomic features of Q(x, y). The couple (15)
and (I) is always false and can be derived when Q(x, y) is supposed to be true, i.
e. Q(x, y) → false . As a first immediate consequence, Q(x, y) is false too. But as
showed above if Q(x, y) then we have both (16) and (II), a contradictory couple
again. All that clarify the antinomic features of 8.1 and leads to re-consider it in
terms of the theory of definition along the lines already developed in [5]. From
the second point-view of the consequences for P , if Q(x, y) → false then ex falso
sequitur quodlibet, (∼a → (a → b)). The existence of the undecidable formula in
Go¨del’s 1931 follows ex falso, i. e. it follows because everything follows from false.
The law (∼a→ (a→ b)) is intuitionistically accepted but it leads P to collapse. P
is inconsistent, in it everything follows, even the existence of a property for which it
is possible neither to give a counterexample nor to prove that it holds of all numbers.
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